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DISCUSSION
EU COMPETITION LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW II: JUSTICE
DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED

By Tim Cowen
DOCTOR MARSDEN: Welcome back. Discussion over
lunch was interesting and there are so many issues on the table
already, but Tim has a contribution for us. You had a chance to
look through this. Tim, your views on the rule of law, economic
development and the future of the European Community Courts.
MR. COWEN: Somebody asked me why did I come to
write something like that. So I thought well,- before I get into it, I
am going to explain a bit of it.
So a real live point of view. If you go back to the early
1990s and look at what BT did, we started off with an
the organization, well-known in the UK providing basic
telephone services in the UK. Indeed it was known at the time as
the 'land of red telephone box'. Up until about the mid-1990s, the
UK was really the extent of the company's opportunity because
in this country (the U.S.) BT was defined as an 'alien', and still
are, and so I'm now an alien in Boston rather than an alien in
New York as the song goes.
Under Section 310(b) of the Federal Communication Act
of 1934, BT was defined as an alien and as a result, it was not
possible to operate in this country without certain license
requirements. And up until the mid 1990s those weren't granted
except at the discretion of the FCC. BT made applications and
we were instrumental in applying to be entitled to run a
telecommunication service in the US as part of the MCI
acquisition, so eventually we did gain the right to expand
here. And so we sought to expand out of the UK into
international markets, and the big chunk of my job at that time
was talking to governments about globalization, together with the
benefits of liberalization, free market, stimulus to the economy,
and actually if you look at BT in the UK, it's at the cutting edge
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of the liberalization process.
How did this come about? If you remember the 1980s in
the UK there was a certain lady in number ten who was quite
keen on liberalization and privatization. Firstly, privatizing parts
of the Home Civil Service into the privatized company that
became BT. And really is a good example of making money as a
regulated
entity
and
at
the
same time
expanding
internationally. This wasn't possible in many countries. It wasn't
possible in the whole of Europe until we managed to persuade the
European Commission and Heads of State that liberalization
would be good as a way of stimulating the basic economy and
improving GDP growth.
And as part of the liberalization of the EU market
program, which I won't go into in any detail, was a series of
pieces of legislation that granted the new liberalized market
players the rights to provide data services and private voice
networks, business services and eventually full liberalization of
all communication services throughout the European Union.
Incidentally, that legislation is going through another round
of refinement from the European Parliament at the moment. So
BT expanded across the EU and then we turned our attention
to other countries around the world. We most recently gained
licenses in places like India and many of the countries in Asia.
So the real live thing is you have a company expanding.
You have that company expanding on the back of the regulatory
opportunity and seeking to do business in other countries. Now
the business is one of providing a data service. That business still
depends on the local operator providing you with access to his
wires. The buildings in any country will be cabled by the
incumbent operator who is also a competitor. They will
already be provided with fiber or copper and it's necessary to do
a deal with the incumbent operator in order to get access. The
incumbent operator is essentially an access monopolist, and that
still hasn't really changed in pretty much every country around
the world.
And
the
liberalization
legislation
which
was
originally agreed in the 1990s at WTO which applied throughout
the world recognized that in seeking to impose what I think many
people here would think of as nondiscriminatory access
obligations on the incumbent players is a classic antitrust
remedy. So if you look at BTs business, it is fundamentally
dependent on access obligations to many companies who are
essentially our competitors. And that represents a substantial
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proportion of the underlying costs. So much of my job
actually involves
going
into
countries
like
Germany,
France, Italy, Spain, and saying the incumbent monopoly access
operator is either not supplying or supplying on discriminatory
terms.
Given a quite hostile environment for investment, we
started by doing a piece of work as to which countries in the
world would it be worth investing. And to do that analysis, the
question was well, "What is the telecommunications regime? Is it
possible to enforce nondiscrimination obligations? Can we get
nondiscriminatory access and expand the business? That was the
first question. You will appreciate that at a glance basically half
the countries in the world aren't going to be worth investing in.
However we identified a number of countries with regimes that
indicated some sort of enforcement pattern where it might be
possible to rely on the local regime and expand the business but
even if we did so, we had to answer the underlying question of
the capabilities and rule of law in the underlying local legal
regime.
We were rather optimistic. We thought that across
continental Europe,
the
underlying
regime
would
probably provide the reasonably efficient redress knowing the
vagaries on the ground, we realized that you have to have an
efficient court system.
So that is the background to why the paper was written;
we needed to check and test and question whether the underlying
court system could provide remedies to the business issues we
faced when dealing with incumbent monopoly access providers.
So what I'm talking about in the paper and here in the
slides is perhaps regarded as a bit academic but there is a really
serious real live set of issues behind it.
Let me go through it. What I've covered in this slide pack
is really the problem with the delays and inconsistencies and the
procedural issues at a national level in Europe, and then the
question that was raised along the way about the speed of
process, and the effective negation of any remedy if you can't get
efficient enforcement within a reasonable period of time. And so
what I've written down here, in the problem statement is the
procedural delays, consequences of delays, raise a significant
impact, and I'll come to that in a broader sense than in just
in telecommunications.
I refer in the next slide to a number of pieces of work that
were done, one of which was a House of Lords Select Committee
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inquiry. That followed the report that people at the British
Institute did in the early 2000s about the inadequate remedy
systems for telecommunications
which was confined to
just looking at those systems at national level without looking at
the underlying court system. If you then look at the court system
on top, that is another layer of problem. But there is a big report
about that which we generated. There is also a very extensive
submission to the House of Lords about the speed of process in
the European court from people like the International Chamber
of Commerce, IBA, CBI and a number of industry groups.
In the next slides I then go into what the issues are around
the process. And I put in here options for reform. As I was talking
to somebody last night, actually this is a paper which has taken
about eight or nine years to develop, and the thing about the
piece at the end that is where I started.
MR. CAMPBELL: You're talking about speed.
PROFESSOR FIRST: Night work.
MR. COWEN: It wasn't really, after all the study it
came out this way, I discovered that the problem was lack of
speed but-anyway, so the procedure today is the problem. I
think it's swiftest to just to read this out for you:
"Bo Vesterdorf said in 2005 the main problem with
the current system of judicial review is not its effectiveness in
terms of how closely the courts scrutinize the Commission's
decision but in terms of the speed of that review. The average
time for proceedings in the European Court of Justice on
preliminary rulings is 19.3 months. Direct actions is 18.2 months."
Remember this is from the point of which you've
been through the national court process and it's the stat going
from national court to ECJ. You don't have a decision at the end
but you just get a ruling out of the ECJ. So this is a middle piece
of the activity.
The court of first instance is, as Philip mentioned earlier,
victim of its own success because the caseload has increased and
the
resources
have
not
increased, and
since
the
caseload increased, of course it can be expected that it's going to
get slower. This is a classic management consultancy problem
about flow and speed of activity, and how you manage a process.
However I think it does not have to be a completely linear
relationship. Process and efficiency improvements could no doubt
be made that would speed the system up without costing
dramatically more in terms of resource. Here there is something
of a strategic issue as the increased caseload will increase delays
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in the absence of process improvements.
I started by looking at these issues from a narrow
telecom's perspective point of view and in BT we created a
correlation analysis measuring the predictability of the system
and the extent of investment, which I haven't put in here but
which is available on the ECTA website. This statistical
correlation analysis really came out of an antitrust analysis. The
theory was in saying, "Well, if this judge and this regulatory
person makes a discretionary statement and discretionary
decisions that will have an impact on investment" It clearly does
and the analysis we did allowed us to decide which countries
have a legal system that is conducive to investment and which do
not. As a matter of analysis the special thing about the telecoms
laws is that they were all based on the same EU laws, they were
new and we could test what the variables were among all the
different countries implementing the same laws. Also telecom is a
great example because there hasn't been any investment absent a
monopoly. So you can chart that. And so we did.
The thing that is striking is that the real differences are in
the underlying legal systems. We correlated the extent
of investment by comparison with how discretionary, slow,
untransparent, or whatever, the local legal system was. We then
got an external economist to do the statistical work. And at BT
we've been following that for about eight years. That is
now published with a trade association called The European
Competitive Telecommunications Association (ETCA) in Europe.
It has become a benchmark tool for charting and encouraging
regulators to be in a sort of competition with each other-to
outdo each other in being more predictable, less black box, more
transparent and the like and by charting each we could
understand in detail the activities that bear on investment
potential.
Having done this work, what was a. bit of a surprise
was something that I found in the World Bank. The World Bank
has been doing some similar work and all the stuff in the World
Bank's Rule of Law index demonstrates that the issues that we
were facing
in
telecoms
had
become
much
more
widely understood in the development community.
This was a breakthrough in thinking for encouraging
GDP growth and investment and supported the liberalization
process. First in Telecoms but now more broadly applied across
thinking about economic development. The thinking in the
development and foreign aid communities for many years had
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been about providing direct aid, food, that type of thing. And
then it went through a phase of development in terms of teaching
and institution building. I think more recently the Rule of Law
index created by the World Bank has been demonstrating it's
actually through institution building that GDP growth and
investment takes place and it is the place to start. The
example they use, the one about give a man a fish and he eats for
a day, teach him to fish and he eats for a lifetime needs
amendment. Without the rule of law and institutions to protect it
then no development takes place at all. If the fishing rod is stolen
by the local terrorists no one gets to catch anything. So you need
to have the whole, you need the institutions in place to
protect property. And I guess that's what this correlation analysis
really
starts
off
with.
Recently
there
has
been
fascinating economic analysis in Latin America that takes the
same perspective. I forget the name of the economist, who did
very similar work by creating land rights to protect and establish
property rights as the starting point for creating sort of
capitalist or home-owning democracy.
PROFESSOR WALLER: I think you're thinking of
Hernando DeSoto.
MR. COWEN: Exactly right. Whether it's proven or not
is another question but we have shown that it probably works in
Telecoms. In the next slide I put in the correlation analysis, which
essentially tends to show that the greater the predictability of a
legal system, the greater its propensity to increase GDP. That is
not fact surprising really. You're not likely to invest in a place
where you think you may get all your money stolen.
One comment that has been made to me after I wrote the
paper was that this was nonsense, because hot money has gone in
and out of developing countries to various different parts of the
world over the last two or 300 years and it hasn't done that on
the back of a robust legal system. I think the response is that if
you look at hot money by definition, it can go in and out very
quickly and if there is a problem with a local legal system, hot
money leaves fast. This may be more true of financial markets
such as exchange rate trading than of long term investments in
infrastructure and buildings that have to depend on the local
legal system working well. Money and investment that can take
place quickly and go in and out, does so very quickly. If you look
at the sort of investment that BT has to get involved in, in the
telecom business, it's a very sticky sort of investment. When
you're digging up roads and installing wires and cables and full
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systems, the exit costs are much higher.
And so the rule of law is even more important if you
are generating sustainable economic growth. I think there is a
powerful point behind this which is the functioning and ability of
the system is even more important for serious investment
decisions that relate to infrastructure builds of any substantial
nature. Rule of law and predictability is critical where there is
an ongoing need for the investor to still be there, which is true of
the telecom business because the return you get on your
investment takes place over a relatively long time. This is not true
of other capital spent or high-fixed-cost infrastructure projects
that do not have long-term revenues attached. The quality of a
legal system is not an issue to somebody who builds a dam
and turns it on and gets paid for doing the work.
If you look on the website of the World Bank you can
have a lot of fun with different countries. I'll show you on one of
the slides. Switzerland is at the top and at the bottom you have
Zimbabwe, which is sort of what you would expect, I guess.
Switzerland is, after all, widely perceived to be a very
predictable, safe, central country in Europe. What is interesting
is the United States has slipped. And where various countries are
in the list, depending on how you choose them, you can actually
search some very interesting things but you can see that better on
the website than you can on the slide. I'll leave you to play with
that one.
So far that establishes essentially the basic point that rule
of law is important for investment. As I said before, I don't think
it's really a big surprise that predictability of the legal systems is
important for investment. It is something that certainly seems to
be forgotten or overlooked by a lot of people making
economic decisions. But it is worth thinking about all of the big
issues of the day through this lens.
One thought that I had when coming here to Boston
was, "Is this part and parcel of something that's gone wrong with
financial markets recently?" Perhaps the enforcement side of the
rule of law equation is the thing that is missing there. And we
can come back to that.
Anyway, turning to the next slide, I reviewed the analysis
Lord Bingham made (in the middle of the work) where he
came out with his eight principles and that built on a number of
very good pieces of work on the definition of the Rule of Law,
Which are referred to in the paper. The ABA has established a
project called the World Justice Project and there are a number
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of papers that have been published on definitions on their web
site.
For the rule of law system to work and deliver GDP
growth, you need the whole system. It is- no good if the system
exists but works too slowly. The question is what timing is
needed in terms of speed? This is where we come to justice
delayed being justice denied. I think there is a broad consensus
now that the legal systems in the EU are just too slow. One of my
colleagues at City University has described the European justice
system as having been built in the 1800s and suitable for Jane
Austen, but not much use to Bill Gates. And why would we
expect it to be suitable in 2000? That is a good way of
thinking about it, because it's not just that it needs to be quicker,
but it needs to be quicker against the needs of a modern economy.
The modern economy moves very fast. When you look at
the telecommunication business, the change is enormous. The
first mobile phones were developed less than twenty or so years
ago for the UK market and certainly they were a bit bigger than
the small ones we have today. Who remembers fax machines? I
don't know whether you still use them or not. But these things
change very rapidly.
The court system takes the amount of time we're talking
about here, when you look at it in this context, it is hopeless in
achieving any sort of justice. It is not a reasonable timeframe. If
you start with real life in a big company, the time horizon that
financial markets allow management is a quarterly period. So,
at the moment we're looking at a three-month time
horizon within which to increase profitability and revenues;
longer than three months is medium term and over a year is over
the horizon. Quarterly profits and expectations are driving most
every business decision in most of the major businesses around
the world. And if I say to a senior businessman, well, it's going to
take thirteen months from the point of which we ended up
litigating a particular thing before we even get to the door of the
court, court and then back again, this is just not going to get any
attention. This is an ineffective system.
*Whetheryou win or not is irrelevant. It just takes too long
to find out. It is beyond the time horizon of many people
in business. I used the expression 'over the horizon' as being
longer than a year. I don't think that's understood by the people
working in the system. I'm certain that the lack of appreciation of
urgency came through from the conclusions of the House of Lords
in the Select Committee hearings. The fact that the system takes a
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long time seems not to be a particular problem. Indeed, it was
recognized by everybody in business who made submissions that
the time periods are too long and the Select Committee
recognized that as well. I think it was established as a fact.
However, what to do about it was not resolved, and it is
remarkable that the Select Committee didn't raise any question
of urgency to solve the problem.
I've listed a number of reasons for the lack of speed and
delays. The reason obviously for doing that, is that if I can
identify the issue then that may create a momentum to fix these
things. That might speed the system up, enable the rule of law
and the system to work effectively and increase GDP.
Now is the time for reform of the court system. In the EU
we have had a considerable enlargement but there has not really
been any reform of the court system or process. Expansion of
areas of competence, increased use of legislation, harmonization,
growing awareness of European law and lawyers actually
applying the law inevitably increases the size and volume of court
cases. When I wrote the paper, it looked like the Lisbon Treaty
was going to be implemented. The UK has endorsed and
supported it. I don't know whether it's going to be passed into
law at the domestic level. The Irish are doing a second or third go
around. So it may at some point come into law.
That raises a big question because essentially there is a
charter of human rights that are enshrined and established in the
Lisbon Treaty. (Whether they apply to individuals directly or
not is a moot point.) But one thing that will happen, as happens
with all new laws is that it will raise attention, and as attention is
raised, there will be more work on those issues, and those issues
will be higher up on the agenda. It is likely that there is going to
be more questions in relation to a new system. All of
which suggests that the court process, which is already creaking
might creak further, or slow to a stop altogether.
One major issue that I touch on in the paper and the slides
is the amount of time wasted in translation. There are twentythree
working languages
and
380
possible
different
linguistic combinations. I suggested that, in the Select Committee
hearings, that if the parties to the case and the judge agreed on
the language of the case, then that could become the language of
the case. This would, make life simpler and easier for
all concerned. Then that could become the official language of the
decision. That idea was supported in the Wall Street Journal in
an article by Bo Vesterdorf, at that time a Judge at the ECJ. Not
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my idea. It was his. And I believe that it was his practice for some
time until the President of the Court reminded him the official
language required the translation through the jurist linguist
process into French. So he had to stop and that is no longer I
believe the practice. So for a period of time there was
some speeding up. Now we are back to square one.
Bo Vesterdorf did give evidence to the Select Committee
and he was asked about his comments in the Wall Street Journal.
He responded that those were comments that had been made in
his private capacity and in his capacity appearing before the
Select Committee he had no further comment to make. I read that
very much as being that the official position of the court was that
they're not changing anything and not keen on improving the
position. There we are. I understand that translation alone adds
an additional seven months into the process as far as we can tell,
from talking to various judges. This is not business at the speed
of thought.
Of course if another language could be chosen, it would be
English. I don't see why people are embarrassed to say that. It's
not simply because it's my second language. It is many European
people's second language. I refer in the paper to the head of the
French Chamber of Commerce speaking to the present French
President in English and this produced a quick withdrawal by
the French President who refused to speak in English. There are
some amusing anecdotes about that in the article in more detail.
The situation is far too important to let misplaced national pride
get in the way of growth and jobs. One thing to do would be to
change the language or make it simpler for the system to operate
in a single language at the request of the parties.
Turning to 'Options for Reform.' I put them into two
categories: procedural changes and changes to the judicial
structure. The much more exciting one is the changes to the
judicial structure. I am not suggesting that we throw the process
or the baby out with the bath water. The obvious point is that
any system needs to be predictable and it needs to secure the
unity of community of law and needs to be transparent and needs
to dispense justice in a sensible way in a meaningful time period
to the 21st Century.
One grave worry with tinkering with any part of the
judicial system or any form of reform is that it actually might
cause more problems than it solves. There is the following
queuing issue which has been put to me. If you increase the
attractiveness of the court process you're likely to end up with
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more cases and this may undermine enforcement. Bigger
queues means slower justice and you are not solving the problem
along the way. I think that's a pathetic criticism and one that
misses the need for speed. More cases means more opportunity to
resolve more issues and increase predictability for the people and
companies concerned. If there is such a level of pent-up demand
for more resolution that indicates a more general failure of
legislation; perhaps some weeding out and prioritization would
solve that problem. We often hear of politicians taking initiatives
to reduce legislation. It is clear that there is a problem and
important to remember then actually what you're trying to do is
increase justice.
I am not going to go into more on procedure. In looking at
a way that would allow more cases to be heard with little
incremental cost, I put forward an idea which I think deserves a
bit more thought. Which was what I call the "Nomination
System" and other people have called it a "Halfway House."
In Europe we have a domestic court system-a lot of
different places under different procedures and different
substantive laws working to different timeframes. We have a
European court system at the top. It would be quite possible to
nominate a court that could operate as a chamber of the
European Court of Justice. This is now actually feasible under
the Nice Treaty. I see no need in the modern, in a diverse,
evolved, and open economy that the national courts could not
wear a European hat. In the same way they can be virtually
present in any national building that deploys the relevant
technology. We could have chambers sitting in different
jurisdictions and use effective technology and virtually be in
any place you want to be.
So you could, for example, nominate the CFI to nominate
the Competition court in the UK or an equivalent local court with
appropriately qualified judges in any other jurisdiction to sit
under the jurisdiction of the CFI. That's a sort of "Halfway
House" which would take cases from the national jurisdiction
and deal with them locally. It is not just that the court would be
physically closer; if a nomination system were adopted, we
would actually increase the capacity of the system to deal with
cases and thereby reduce the amount of time involved. Justice
could be speeded up.
I have gone through some of the benefits in the paper.
Perhaps not explicitly written there here, the nomination system
would ensure that the cohesiveness of community law is achieved
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in another way. It would provide an opportunity for
retired judges from the ECJ to work at the national level in the
nominated court. This is also a way of increasing both knowledge
and experience and capacity and would probably be a very good
thing.
Another possibility other than the nomination system
would be a circuit court type of system. I know the U.S. has
those systems. We have them in the UK or have had them in the
past in the UK. There could also be alternatives such as a sort
of merry-go-round of judges going around different parts of
Europe or some variation of the two. In the context of the Lisbon
Treaty, part of the treaty requires greater collaboration between
the member states, and there are systems and processes in
the treaty that seek to improve decision-making powers. This
would be in some ways in parallel to that sort of thinking.
I talked about language. Another thought would be simply
fast-track procedures. The issue here is which court process
would apply. If an ECJ chamber was operating at the national
level and in order to retain the coherence of the entire EU system,
it would probably have to apply European court process at the
national chamber level. Otherwise, competition between national
courts could take place and one set of processes would no doubt
be more attractive than another. There are dangers but some
degree of competition in the system might be no bad thing. It
would clearly make very little sense for a chamber of the ECJ
sitting in Barcelona hearing two local Spanish companies that
want the case to proceed in Spanish to have to translate
everything into French through the juris consults in. Luxembourg.
This is a useful example because most of the cases, if not
all of them, would be referred from a national court in a
national language to a national judge, and deal with the case in
front of him in the natural language. I have no problem at all
with translation so that people could see what is being done or
maybe operate in a language that we all understand. But that is
something that possibly doesn't need to hold up the quest for
justice.
MR. COWEN: One point. What has happened since
putting the suggestions forward is that there has been some
movement in the ECJ in terms of pulling some of the cases away
from the CFI in creation of the trademark court. The idea is that
if the court removes the case from CFI to a judicial panel, then
that might do something, but it seems to be very limited in
its effect, and there has been no real reduction in delay as far as I
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can see.
Another thought that I put in here is the idea of
creating individual specialist chambers. We can cover it
in discussion if you like. So to conclude, I think we can easily
summarize: something must be done and the question really is
"What?"
Thank you very much.
DOCTOR MARSDEN: Other than the language issue,
obviously quite a few of the issues that you raised will be familiar
to scholars of other judicial systems around the world. So why
don't we start with Professor Cavanagh who is going to comment
on your point and open up the discussion.
PROFESSOR CAVANAGH: I must confess that I had
some mixed feelings after Spencer had recruited me. I had tickets
for the Yankees for opening day, which I gave up, and thank God
they got hammered yesterday 10-2 so this was a better place to
be.
Tim, I thought your paper was great. I enjoyed reading it.
I can understand why it would take a long time to search the
literature very carefully. And that's getting to be a lost art.
We have too many scholars who aren't doing the work. The idea
is to create what I think exists here, somewhat a treasure trove of
ideas that people can cite and that's what we ought to be doing in
academic writing. The nice thing here is that this is a
good repository for a lot of ideas and that really adds value here.
Very thorough discussion. I'm also happy in my other life. I'm
a civil procedure professor, so I'm happy to deal with procedural
issues, that in this case obviously complements what we are
talking about, antitrust.
One thing I wanted to raise that you didn't was the
threshold matter. We have been talking here today about rule of
law and what does that mean. You make an interesting point.
With respect to law is it good because it's a law or is it a law
because it's good? Very fundamental jurisprudential question
that we ought not to lose sight of when we discuss this.
And you talk about laws instrumentality. The only thing
the law does is do what the law giver wants, any
dictatorial system wants. Or is the law what I think, and I think
should be what you think it should be, is sort of a compilation of
what the populous thinks, complication of society deals. Then
good, that gets codified and you make that point and I think
that's good. And of course that promotes, from that
flows freedom of democracy and all of the benefits that we have
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been discussing.
You talked about the need for reform, and as an American
I am sitting here looking at the statistics, 19.3 months in the
European court of justice, 18.2 months for direct actions, 17.8 that is not so bad for antitrust. Most antitrust in this country, if
you're two to three years that is good. Many take that much
longer. So I suppose in one sense it's where you come from. Now
we have some things, unique problems here in the United States.
Speedy Trial Act requires criminal trials to go forward within 120
days. That doesn't always happen, but the point is, in courts like
Eastern District of New York where you have a heavy criminal
docket, there is a crowding out effect of civil cases, and
particularly complex civil cases. The individual assignment
system we have. A judge gets assigned to a case, if he has a heavy
workload you may get pushed back. And then of course things
that you don't have like discovery, which pushes things back on
the time line.
But there are different causes I guess for delaying in our
system and your system. One problem I see, the language
thing may be insoluble, but the merger thing is something I think
has to be addressed. We've addressed that in the U.S. through
expedited procedures with TROs and preliminary injunctions.
And it would be good I think if you could develop a system that
was like that. The reform proposals talked a little bit about
procedural reforms and actually the article recognizes some of the
things we tried to do in the United States. Hands-on management
since 1983, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require courts to
exercise more management. Firm deadlines, faster decisions.
You talk about the United States' system in terms of
federal and state courts and power sharing, and I guess that's
where we start going in opposite directions because that's not
a model that you want with your nomination system, your
halfway house. You're introducing a program that is probably
uniquely European and maybe it's the way it should be. I'm not
sure at the end of the day whether more procedure is going to be
successful. And I'll tell you why.
We in the United States have had a lot of procedural
reform in the 1980s and 1990s and this grows out of the
recognition that pre-trial discovery is very expensive, it often
drives outcome, particularly from a defense perspective, it's just
too expensive to litigate this in the pre-trial phase. We'll just pay
to get out. And the sense that that is somehow a form of
highway robbery or extortion has pushed the courts to
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do something oddly enough substantively and that's what you're
seeing in the Trinko and Twombly cases.
The sense, particularly you see this in the Twombly case,
and the Supreme Court citing Judge Easterbrook saying
procedural reforms don't work.2 And the reason they don't work
is because the party is not the court's control of discovery. The
pleadings.
of the
control
court's
the
not
party is
Judge Easterbrook said that in 1986. That is definitely not true
anymore. If it ever was it's certainly not true after the 1993
Federal Civil Rules or the 2000 amendment.
But yet there is a sense now after Twombly that the way to
deal with delay is not to address it procedurally but to address
it substantively. And how do we address it substantively? We cut
the case off at a time we know that we survive which is the
motion to dismiss stage. Or if you survive the motion to dismiss
now after cases after the Hydrogen Peroxide3 case in the
Third Circuit, CanadianExport' in the First Circuit, and IP0 5 in
the Second Circuit, if you get through Twombly now you get cut
off at the class action stage.
So it's interesting that even in the U.S. where we have a
lot of procedural law, a lot of procedural protections, the key to
a
as
substantively,
viewed
now being
is
swiftness
substantive solution not as a procedural solution and in that sense
probably we may be going backwards.
Specialized courts, we may have some specialized courts in
the United States. Tax courts, court of claims, but generally the
concept that you should have on any given day is that federal
judges in the United States are generalists, the concept
you should have maybe judges specialize in certain areas is not,
well, we still want to have the idea, the ideal of the judge is the
generalist. There is a lot of pressure in the United States mostly
from the judicial conference of the United States, which is the
administrative arm of the Supreme Court.
Justice Roberts is not only Chief Justice in the United

' Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
540 U.S. 398 (2004).
2 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 at 560.
3 In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir.

2008).
' In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 533
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008).
5 In re Initial Public Offering Antitrust Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir.
2006).
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States, he is head of the federal court system. And the
administrative conference, they like to push cases. And they
like speed, maybe speed for speed's sake. And in that respect I
believe antitrust cases have always been viewed as being
somewhat generous.
I think your position is antitrust cases are very important
to hold them up; hold up business decisions and that's not good.
In the United States it's like this is the program. You get it. If
you're going to have an antitrust suit it's going to take a long
time. Except in the merger context where .we do have
expedited procedures. But I think at the end of the day I wonder
the extent to which given our experience in the U.S., the extent to
which procedural devices are going to create speed or if you're
going to have to go to something like they've done in the
United States which is certainly in my view making a deal with
the devil.
PROFESSOR WALLER: We heard a reference to
specialized courts. I welcome the thoughts of the people who also
specialize in the IP side who have some experience with certain
courts for the federal circuit, not as to the substance of the
law but as to whether those having a specialized court has
brought swifter justice.
PROFESSOR FIRST: I don't do IP law, but the contrast
between swiftness and justice was a good one, for the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. But certainly if you're trying to
draw on U.S. experience there has been a lot of writing
about what the effect is of having that specialized court, but I
don't think the writing has been particularly on the speed of the
court, but maybe Stacey can say, but more on how it's affected
patent law, and I think many people are unhappy with that
specialization. That said, there are apparently, my understanding
is, that there are district court judges who are now tending to
specialize on the trial level in patent litigation, sort of an informal
specialization not one done statutorily. So there are always
these tensions.
One of the questions I wanted to raise actually, something
I picked up in Phillip's paper and yours as well, is that I'm
wondering when we're all talking about appeals, if we are talking
about the same things. And I thought about it also with Terry's
comment. I have a sense of appeals as not being hearings, but
just straight on the law. But when I read Philip's paper, talk
about, it's not even a full appeal as opposed to what I think of as
an appeal. So the context of what the CFI does as an appellate
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tribunal and what the DC circuit does-which turned Microsoft
around in four months after oral argument-you have to think
about that sort of comparison is as well. You may even be talking
beyond speed, asking what the functions are in this system of
review, particularly if you can't count on the fact finder to have
really found the facts. I just throw that out.
PROFESSOR DOGAN: I agree that the purpose, and I
think the function of the federal circuit had as much to do with
substance as with speed, and that it had a pro-patent design and
effect. The federal circuit was supposed to bring uniformity to the
patent system, and to make the patent more robust. It certainly
had the latter effect, probably more than originally intended.
Interestingly, from my recent conversations with patent lawyers,
the perception is that the Supreme Court's correction in the last
couple of years has radically changed things. So we're seeing a
pendulum swing in the other direction.
On the point of specialized courts more generally, my
reaction whenever someone talks about specialized courts is to
ask why this class of cases is entitled to a specialized court as
opposed to some other type. Many jurisdictions have specialized
intellectual property courts, because lawmakers (with the
''encouragement" of the United States Trade Representative)
were persuaded of the need for substantive specialization as well
as speed in deciding these cases. I think as a policy matter you
need to make a persuasive argument as to why your particular
business concern is more deserving of the speed of justice than
many of the other deserving concerns out there.
MR. CAMPBELL: With respect to specialty courts,
Canada has a competition tribunal, which is a specialized entity
for the purpose of adjudicating these kinds of cases. It is a first
instance tribunal that hears cases, so in a sense it is supervising
our competition bureau, which is our enforcement agency.
One lesson is that I think there is scope to use special
procedures and get an expert body to do things differently,
including faster in areas where that is important. We have
struggled over twenty years to do that. We started with a
hybrid membership of judges plus economists and other
lay experts. The judges in fact tended to control the procedure
and we ended up with a very court-like approach that wasn't
very much faster. However, over a period of time, there has been
some streamlining of rules, procedures, and time limits, as well as
proactive case management. I think we could still do more in
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these areas.
The second lesson is that you need a critical mass of cases.
One of the problems is getting decision-makers who are good
quality appointees. Many people in Canada would not take an
appointment to the tribunal because they would be sitting around
not doing anything. And so case flow is needed for the specialty
structure to get quality appointments. The Canadian model is a
possible model for people to look at despite its imperfections.
DOCTOR MARSDEN: You can't have specialist
competition courts in every jurisdiction because there isn't
enough work for them; besides I'm all in favor of them being
expert judges first of all, and having experience in any manner of
hearings so they maintain high evidential standards, keep cases
on schedule, and write clear judgments.
PROFESSOR PATTERSON:
To follow up on
Stacey's comment. As a patent lawyer the federal circuit is not
well thought of. If we think back, between efficiency and
accuracy, even if it were efficient, generally you get different
panel fits with each other, paying no attention what is being
said, Supreme Court constantly backing it whenever it takes a
decision. Contrasted with a court chancery which is quite well
thought of, and an expert business court and interesting that the
federal circuit court of appeals, chancery court is more like trial
court and makes you wonder if that has a role in terms of, or
maybe the federal circuit is dysfunctional for reasons we don't
understand.
PROFESSOR WALLER: One other issue you might want
to address before you jump in. Your paper and presentation have
convinced me that there is a serious problem, but you
haven't convinced me that the problem is as acute in the merger
area, which you seem to use as the poster boy. And the reason I
say this, not because I also agree with you but that a long court
proceeding is often death to a merger without regard to its
competition attributes. But my real concern is, correct me if I'm
wrong, but that in the real world it seems like the agency decision
to challenge is the more frequent death meld to the merger or
even to open a second request/phase two sort of investigation.
That's where the deals often fall apart. And of course
anything that lengthens that process increases the chance. But by
the time you're in the court system, the parties have already made
one guess about what the competition aspects are. The agency
has made another guess, and whether you're the Department
of Justice or the FTC seeking an injunction or the firm seeking an
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appeal, it's almost too late at that point whether it's six months or
eighteen months.
MR. COWEN: The option of a nomination system could
increase capacity and should speed up decision-making. I tend to
be persuaded that specialized courts could be a problem in EU
law. Sir David Edward reminded everyone at the Select
Committee that the whole EU treaty is about competition. So
how can you possibly divorce one special case of another, and
half the patent cases are monopoly and the other side, splitting
these things up? I see huge difficulty in a EU context with that.
Just increasing capacity in the current system is another thing
that could be done. I don't think that would actually be as
attractive as perhaps some form of decentralization.
One worry that I've got and which has actually been said
by a number of judges off the record is that the capability and
quality of the judges in Luxembourg in Competition law has been
reduced in recent times given the lack of a history and culture of
competition law in many of the newer member states.
To the point about substance solving the procedural
problems, I see how that can be done. I am told that one very
well-known judge has said that there isn't very much competition
in Europe anyway so the easiest way of resolving all these
competition cases is not to have cases going to the court. Robust
case management is needed to prevent abuse of the system, and I
can see that in relation to discovery there may be a temptation for
the defense to use broad-based discovery as a way of slowing
down cases. However, at some point robust case management
raises a question of fairness and justice.
If judges are making decisions to discourage cases because
they don't understand them, that's a really big problem. It is
likely that there is little of that going on though and the system
has many checks and balances so it would be very visible.
Alternatively there are cases where the decisions are interrelated
with a wider foreign policy objectives and a need to establish
huge U.S. national, if not world, champions. There is no doubt
that the outgoing US administration talked about the "New
American Century" and was keen on laissez faire policies that
allowed large organizations to become massive multinationals.
This rationale has been put forward quite seriously behind the
scenes. I think if you look at Trinko in particular, that could be
seen to be a case where such thinking had influence. As we
discussed earlier, this is not sinister in the U.S. system; the
economic policies that were referred to by Scalia were prevalent
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in the government at the time.
What this paper practice did was to point out the
ineffectiveness of the system to actually achieve enforcement of
the law. That is a really big problem. I think it's probably a
bigger problem today than when I wrote it because we didn't
have the same degree of economic concern. The credit crunch
should make us more sensitive to the need to make sure that all
aspects of the system work in a way that secures and supports
economic growth and jobs.
I think that is partly an answer to the question about
mergers. If you look at liberalization telecoms, water, and energy
gas, which have taken place in Europe over the last twenty years,
they have provided a huge focus for the single market and the
market has expanded and economic growth has taken place. The
speed with which the system keeps the market open is less visible
than with mergers. Mergers are a great example of how some
developments can be just literally stopped dead in their
tracks because of the slowness in the system.
The thing about that, when we were doing evidence to the
Select Committee, the question was asked "How many more
appeals from the European Commission to the CFI did we think
there would be, if the court process were more effective?" The
answer is that it is quite a difficult thing to be able to establish.
And I think that our response was well, you wouldn't want to
generate a large number of appeals. The parties to mergers
are not likely to do that because their incentive is to close the deal
as quickly as they can.
The real concern which we pointed to on mergers is that
parties to a merger will agree to a very large number of things,
not because they are the right things to agree to, but because the
agencies know that they can force concessions, because of the
lack of speedy judicial oversight. If you look at the number of
cases where concessions were given (the work was done by the
ICC). and you look at the number of cases where concessions had
been provided in the second stage or to avoid second-stage
mergers, they're really quite substantial. What we didn't know at
the time is whether those concessions were regarded as really
necessary.
Certainly, my personal experience of mergers is that a
number of things get asked for that are totally unrelated to any
substantial concern but they give the official the ability to claim a
scalp, and it is part of the price to get the deal done that
demonstrates at a superficial level that an official is doing
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something. Indeed there is an office in DG Comp, it's called the
trophy room, where they have all of the different things that
they've got as concessions for mergers. And I think that's very
telling. In an objective system of justice should anyone be proud
of a trophy room? That could be seen as a worrying indication
of the culture that you're dealing with.
PROFESSOR GREENE: Fascinating discussion. One
thing that interests me about mergers within the U.S. is the longstanding history of antitrust agency promulgated guidelines
during which they have morphed, in international law terms,
from soft law into something more akin to hard law.
With that as background, my question is two-fold: In the
first instance, what. have been the EC Guidelines' primary effects
upon the procedural and/or substantive review of mergers by
enforcement officials? Secondly, have the merger guidelines
crystallized or otherwise articulated the law in a manner that has
influenced the courts?
MR. COWEN: From my perspective, U.S. merger
guidelines or what the European Commission does?
PROFESSOR
GREENE:
European
Commission.
Though I would be curious about observations regarding either.
MR. COWEN: Christian can probably comment as well.
If you look at the series of procedures that are adopted by
the European Commission in merger filings, they particularize
those facts that are needed and on the face of it can speed things.
On the face of it that can be the case but there is a lot of
discretion still built into the system and failure to submit even a
small set of facts can in practice be sued to argue to slow things
down. Typically parties will prepare the form CO, discuss it with
the officials in advance of filing in order to attempt to agree on a
relevant fact base. In practice this gives officials more time
before the clock starts. And that's become quite widespread in
practice. This is not all downside for the parties concerned. I
don't know whether it's something that others do or generally do
not do, but my experience is that the period before the clock starts
provides an opportunity to educate for a considerable period of
time before the full procedure starts. This enables the parties to
get more done in stage one. In principle, stage one is officially one
month but there can be a long lead-in period. This raises the time
available for third parties and whether they are getting similar
time to present their case to he authorities. This may be a big
issue particularly in a merger in a contested case.
I think there are real issues of the amount of time that is
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available to the party by comparison with the amount of time
available to a third party. I found out during the course of
the first week of September 2008 that a transaction was taking
place that had been announced on the 15th of August 2008 when
most people are on holiday, and as an affected party we hadn't
been notified of it by the Commission, and one of the
external firms rang me up and said, do you know about this? This
is incredible. There is a real issue for third parties to be able to
make their comments known during that initial one-month
period. Being wise to this, some parties have adopted a bit of a
practice of doing things during the summer and the Christmas
holidays, which may be pragmatic but not terribly fair.
MR. AHLBORN: I think my guess would be that the
biggest impact of the Commission's behavior toward mergers at
the cases subsequently brought but I can't sort of put any
evidence to it is the quality of the judicial review. And what you
saw was in merger cases you had a period where sort of merger
did excellent work and then they overreached and so what
happened, they were sort of extending theory of worse and worse
and GE Honeywell was sort of probably the best example and
then came a point when the court said enough is enough. And
because you didn't have proper judicial review in terms of it was
taking too long, parties were never challenged, the Commission.
completely went out of control.
You then had the Commission was whacked in 2002 a
couple of times on the merger side and since then things have
been significantly better. So the quality of judicial review is much
more important than whatever guidelines you can possibly have.
And the problem we have at the moment is that the
average quality of the judges have gone down dramatically
downhill. And so for me the most important thing is how do you
select judges, because I do not believe there are no good judges in
the new member state-becomes a dumping ground of politically
sort of people who need sort of a job and what you have ended up
with is a quality of the court which leaves a lot to be desired. So
the first issue you need to address is maybe to make self selection.
CFI actually has a role in deciding, determining who is
going to be as part of the judges. And I think that question
is much more important. Specialist courts, if you have high
quality generalist, I prefer that to dumb specialists. And I think
the generalist is finely tuned, and you see to some extent debate
with the last two commissioners,
not at court level
but commission level, where you have someone now who, let's
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put it this way, is sort of lightly is a generalist but what you know
politically very attuned.
So what you have done in terms of positive aspects she has
grounded competition policy and sort of what is political
acceptable rather than what is particularly brilliant competition
policy compared to the previous commissioner who was
technically far superior but there you have it between
generalist and specialist.
PROFESSOR HYLTON: Just a minor point. It strikes
me speed and substance are inevitably linked, and that whether
we say the court is making a link or not, they're going to be
linked anyway. Suppose you increase the delay in the court
system. That's
going - to
have
important, substantive
effects because people on the plaintiff's side will say it takes too
long and therefore I am not going t6 sue, which then gives a
shield to potential defendants who face a reduced risk of a
lawsuit so there is less of a perceived need on their part to comply
with the law. So there is one substantive effect, if you think of
substance as a real effect of the law on people's conduct,
then that's a way in which delay has a substantive effect.
Another argument is that as you increase the length of
proceedings and delay, then people who are sued know that it's
.more costly to them. That has an effect on them. They say to
themselves "once the lawsuit comes it is going to cost me so much
no matter what I did, so whether I comply with the law or not I
am going to have to pay a whole lot of money." It strikes me that
is another way in which we get an unavoidable link between
procedure (or speed) and substance. And Twombly is a case
where the court openly says we're going to recognize that
link. We are going to do something about it. They could have
gone .in either direction.
The Court has been motivated by these error cost
arguments lately, particularly by the concern over false
positives. Twombly reflects that. Twombly reflects a reaction to
this inevitable link between speed and substance, but moving in a
direction that is motivated by the concern about false positives, or
false convictions, and therefore cutting off plaintiff's lawsuits
quickly. The Court could have gone in the other direction and
said we're concerned about false negatives instead.
It strikes me that you are going to have that link no matter
what, and instead of seeing Twombly as a deal with the devil, I
would view it as a court openly saying we are going to
do something about this. As I think common law courts have
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done for a long time. And there is a debate that people can have
over the direction of the court. But to me the link is there. It's up
to a court whether to confront it and to that extent I think it's
desirable for courts to confront this link.
MR. ALESE: I think your question is whether cases going
to the courts in Europe are reduced since the guidelines were
issued. My take is that since the EC guidelines, just like the one
you have, are not really laws and are not binding on the courts,
there should be no increase in the amount of challenged cases.
PROFESSOR GREENE: Give them time.
MR. ALESE: Exactly.
PROFESSOR GREENE: Did it clarify the law in a way
where it sort of, did it bring a certain clarity to what it was so
people had a different sense of what their odds were going in?
MR. ALESE: I think it does for those in the
world competition. But I think lawyers and economists were
using most of the concepts in the guidelines before they came in
officially - so no net effects, really.

Coming back to part of Tim's paper on the relationship
between GDP competitor and rule of law, this is the first time in
my life that I see a table in which Nigeria is below Pakistan.
Usually, Nigeria always beat Pakistan to the first place in tables
relating to corrupt countries and practices across the world perhaps, we got bribed by the Pakistanis to come below them
here. However, there is an importance to this table because we're
discussing here antitrust and the rule of reason. GDP competitor
relates to economic efficiency. Economic efficiency, on the other
hand, is something that can only thrive where there is rule of law.
In many developing countries, like Nigeria, the rule of law is not
upheld to the same standard you'd find in Western countries.
And this goes back, to an extent, to what Keith Hylton was
talking about in the morning, when he defined the concept in
a narrow sense.
PROFESSOR STUCKE: One thing to pick up on Keith,
interplay between procedural and substantive. We were at the
antitrust division after Arch Koal and where the court rejected, it
required us to do then much more fact-specific inquiry and that
then is very costly and very time consuming. And as you move
away from presumption, even as you start moving away from the
guidelines to have to even bring on tougher showing after Oracle,6
6

2005).

United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal.
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that is in turn going to have cost as well. So you are always, I
mean to one extent, it goes back to the fundamental
question about rule of reason is that yes you might have the times
that you can get it correctly but then there may be attended cost
in terms of cost, delay, and the like that you need to be aware of
as well.

